Building a Continent: The Museum of Modern Art and the Politics of Circulating Images by Patricio Del Real

I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) to do research on three general areas pertaining to my dissertation on modern Latin American architecture in the 1950s, a project I am developing in the Architecture History and Theory Program in the Graduate School of Architecture Planning and Preservation at Columbia University. An important case study in my examination of modern Latin American architecture and its representation is the exhibition Latin American Architecture since 1945, held in New York in 1955 at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). My hypothesis is that modern architecture provided a new spatial conception for the imagined community called “Latin America;” that it constructed Latin America through iconographic images of paradigmatic architectural projects in a dynamic exchange between actual buildings and their representation, and that in assembling this transnational territory it wove aesthetic forms onto development policies and Cold War politics.

My goal was to study several archival collections at the RAC in order to unravel the relationship between representation, politics, and aesthetics. My first questions revolved around the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) grant to the International Program of MoMA. Second, were the exchanges between Nelson A. Rockefeller (NAR) and MoMA personnel regarding the Latin American architecture show, and third, the activities of NAR as Special Assistant to President Eisenhower with respect to post-war policies in relation to Latin America. The intent is to uncover the relationship between these three areas of inquiry.

During my research at the RAC, I also encountered related questions that unfolded as they generally do while doing research, thus opening new questions for future projects. At the end of the Second World War, the Museum of Modern Art undertook a dynamic policy of cultural exportation as part of an expansion policy that imagined MoMA as a key international player, assuming a leadership role in post-war culture. This new outlook involved the expansion of the Department of Circulating Exhibitions, which had started haphazardly in 1932 with the circulation of the influential exhibition,


Modern Architecture: International Exhibition — from a nationally focused program (defined early on as comprising the U.S. and Canada) into an international one. Since then, the Department of Circulating Exhibitions had engaged in managing and organizing international exchanges, primarily with Europe. By the end of the Second World War, the definition of what was international had changed. The U.S had attained not only economic hegemony; it had also developed an indigenous art movement — Abstract Expressionism — that proclaimed cultural independence from Europe. MoMA, and in particular the Rockefeller family members involved in the museum (specifically Abby Aldrich Rockefeller and NAR), had been key supporters of American art. By the late 1940s and early 1950s it was felt that MoMA had the possibility of exporting American art to the world. This was the context in which MoMA’s International Program was formed in 1952. MoMA expanded the international component of the Department of Circulating Exhibitions by creating a parallel yet at times not fully separate program. Having a single director for both the Department of Circulating Exhibitions and the new International Program institutionalized this overlap. In 1946, Porter McCray succeeded Elodie Courter as director of the Department of Circulating Exhibitions. McCray trained as an architect at Yale University and worked for Wallace K. Harrison, a senior partner at the New York architecture firm Harrison & Abramovits. It was through Harrison that McCray met Nelson A. Rockefeller. given the responsibility of overseeing the newly formed International Program. The RBF was


In 1952, McCray also was central in the formation of MoMA’s International Program. As MoMA sought to develop its International Program by pursuing external funding, its officers approached both the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.


The involvement of the Rockefeller family in MoMA did not guarantee immediate or unlimited funds from the RBF. The RBF had extensive commitments, and MoMA was one of many institutions that the RBF supported. McCray put together a comprehensive grant proposal that dovetailed with RBF interests. Part of this was the RBF stipulation that the International Program have a continued life without RBF monies. On June 25, 1952, the RBF awarded MoMA a grant of $125,000 a year for five years for the development of the International Exhibitions Program, starting on July 1 of that year.


The cumulative total of $625,000 awarded to the International Program would finance a variety of projects organized in five sections of activities:

1) U.S. participation in major art biennials
2) Museum exhibitions sent abroad under the International Program

3) Sending works of art to international exhibitions
4) Preparing exhibitions on other areas of the world to be presented in the U.S.
5) Exhibitions prepared for the U.S. Government for circulation by its agencies


The grant proposal emphasized the intent to “present in foreign countries and the United States the most significant achievements of the art of our time.”


One can appreciate, however, that four of the five directives involved exporting U.S. culture to the world, and only one was aimed at presenting the “achievements of other areas of the world” to the American public. It is significant to note that prior to 1957 — the final year of the RBF grant — MoMA’s Department of Architecture and Design produced most of the exhibitions under category four.


Moreover, with the exception of Textiles and Ornamental Arts of India, all were in the area of architecture: Latin American Architecture since 1945, The Modern Architecture of Italy: Architecture and Design, and The Architecture of Japan.


This reversal of the cultural flow, from exporting U.S. culture to importing world culture, appears peculiar, considering the overwhelming focus on exporting in the International Program’s directive. Its focus on importing foreign architecture precisely during a period of high-quality architectural production in the U.S., a production that was accompanied by clear technological advancements and construction techniques, also appears odd. One of the strong points of the grant proposal was MoMA’s commitment to institutionalize its International Program. To do this, in November 1953 MoMA created the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art “to enlist the aid of community leaders from all parts of the United States in promoting cultural exchange.”


The relationship was finalized in December 13, 1956 with the signing of a three-party agreement between MoMA, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the International Council of the Museum of Modern Art, Inc. Under this agreement the International Council would gradually assume full funding of the International Exhibitions Program. The RBF would contribute, on a tapering basis, an additional $460,000 over the next five years, after which the International Council would be responsible of all funding. Under the stipulations of the agreement, the International Council was to become a “membership corporation under the laws of the state of New York.”


The intent was for the Council to acquire a national character, superseding its original local organization, and effectively separate itself from MoMA, acquiring legal and financial independence from the Museum by 1962. As stated in the agreement: “The Council will cooperate with museums throughout the Unites States in order to achieve a truly national status.” The agreement also allowed that “Council may at any time change its name to eliminate there from reference to ‘The Museum of Modern Art,’ or in any other manner.”


The Council agreed to continue the projects initiated by the International Program, but also “to strike a balance between exhibitions planned to constitute the United States representation at international exhibitions, other major shows intended for larger centers, and those intended for smaller communities.”


The Council’s aim was to reach deeper into society. When examining the list of proposed projects for the first year of the Council’s full involvement (1957-58), one sees that the export directive of the International Program received greater emphasis. can be interpreted as the International Program’s final separation from MoMA’s Department of


This Circulating Exhibitions, although both programs still remained under the same director. Chaired by Mrs. John D. Rockefeller 3rd (Blanchette Rockefeller) and composed of some of MoMA’s most influential trustees, the International Council sought to promote a parallel between artistic creation and political freedom under bourgeois democratic capitalism. For guidance it turned to intellectuals such as George F. Kennan (a key ideologue of the early Cold War) and European art directors such as John Rothenstein, director of the Tate Gallery in London.


The Council also engaged mass media industrialists such as New York publisher Alex L. Hillman.


The expansion of MoMA’s international commitment was accompanied by a preoccupation with mass media. When it made its major grant to fund the International Program in June 1952, the RBF also granted MoMA $50,000 a year over three years for the development of a television research program.


Although these two programs were independent, there seems to be an incipient engagement with mass communication techniques and ideas as part of MoMA’s overall cultural program. The International Council, however, relied on more traditional efforts such as organizing lectures, supporting publications and awarding travel grants to art historians like Meyer Shapiro and artists such as Ben Shahn.


Its actions clearly oriented the International Program towards critical areas of the world, these being the Iron Curtain and those under immediate Communist threat like Western Europe. One of the ground-breaking projects undertaken by the International Program, along with the State Department and USIA, was the exhibition Built in USA: Post-War Architecture, which opened in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1956. The International Program also engaged Latin America in its exhibitions program. For example, it sent a Spanish and Portuguese version of Built in USA: Post-War Architecture to the region. It had done this on its own accord, however, without the government sponsorship the exhibit had received when it circulated in Europe.


In the 1950s, Latin America was seen as part of Western Culture. Although plagued by some social and political problems, its unprecedented economic growth gave many hope that the region would rapidly approach “Free World” standards of living. The 1955-56 QUANTICO II meetings exalted the region as an area that demonstrated what U.S. foreign and economic policies could achieve.


For U.S. policy makers, Latin America was a showcase to be exhibited across the world, especially to the newly decolonizing areas assembled around the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. Only minor incidents, like the 1954 Guatemalan coup, tarnished U.S. policies. The U.S. government saw no need to engage in cultural or soft exchanges, because to their eyes the region was a success, and if any problems arose there, the Guatemalan experience revealed that they could be easily resolved. However, warnings were being heard at the State Department and from NAR, as Special Assistant to Eisenhower. Many documents in the recently declassified NAR Washington files call attention to the U.S. government’s lack of interest in the region and underscore how, if such general disregard persists, the region would become a major source of concern to the U.S. These documents warn about Communism in Chile and Brazil’s economic problems, and Argentina continued to be a source of concern after Peron’s rise to power in 1946. Not until the early 1960s, however, with the advent of the Cuban Revolution, was Latin America considered a primary target area by the U.S. government. Included among the “young nations” of the decolonizing world in the 1960s, Latin America was enveloped by a feverish cultural activity and became an important target for U.S. cultural exports. MoMA expressed this urgency in 1961:

The dramatic emergence of the ‘young’ nations of Asia, Africa, the Near East and Latin America has placed a heavy burden of responsibility upon the United States, to whom these countries look for guidance and assistance in many ways. Besides technical and material advancement, these areas are striving for intellectual contact with other nations and urgently need to share and communicate the spiritual values of the arts.


But cultural exchange was now overtaken by the need to expose the region to technological knowledge, an area in which architecture assumed a central position: For those countries in various stages of transition to modern technology, the Museum’s proposed program includes a series of architecture and design exhibitions intended to demonstrate some solutions to problems with which these countries are particularly concerned. Such topics as city- planning and public works buildings would be emphasized, focusing primary attention on hospitals, universities, schools, civic centers, factories, markets, railway stations, airports, bus terminals, bridges and dams.


After efforts to circulate Latin American Architecture since 1945 throughout the region failed, the exhibition was dismantled in 1961 after circulating in the U.S. and Canada. MoMA exhibitions such a Roads and Lettering by Modern Artists, prepared by the Department of Architecture, were sent to Latin America through the International Program.


Art was not fully abandoned in the midst of these efforts, as the International Program engaged established governmental infrastructures, such as the Art in Embassies projects.


The urgent need to guide Latin America and prevent further ideological derailing marked the need for an expanded cultural “exchange” program for the region. This new need was coeval with the International Council’s full administration of the International Program. But the Council was never able to raise the necessary funds to develop a comprehensive program for Latin America.


New private foundations such as the International Study Group on Freedom and Democracy and the Inter-American Committee, which later became the Inter-American Foundation for the Arts(25), competed for available funds. further limited the Council’s ability to advance its general mission.


The inherent conflicts between MoMA and the International Council revolved primarily around fundraising activities and


By 1962 MoMA’s International Program was running a deficit of over a quarter of a million dollars.


Its director had changed, and art had become highly politicized.


The documents on the grant for the development of an International Exhibitions Program demonstrate a dynamic cultural policy deployed by MoMA, one that overlapped with, supplemented, and at times supplanted U.S. government initiatives. By acting as a cultural broker, the Museum of Modern Art promoted a clear political ideology. It is not so much that aesthetics was used to mask politics, forcing one to uncover hidden “back room” conspiracies, but rather that hegemony — the willing participation in established power — guided all MoMA endeavors. The wholehearted belief in ideas like free enterprise and democracy permeates most documents. The ease with which these beliefs flow erases any seams between politics and aesthetics, effectively canceling any conflict. The confidence with which these beliefs are held homogenizes all experiences, successfully blinding those who support them. These ideas are seen only in their brightest light.

Many letters in the RAC’s collections regarding MoMA and its activities exhort the values of U.S. democracy as embodied in its art. Modern art and culture was seen as a progressive and democratizing force, a tool to be used to promote and defend such ideals. MoMA, however, had to negotiate a complicated political terrain. For example, it is understandable, however disturbing, that when the wife of the “president” of Guatemala, Carlos Castillo Armas, visited New York, MoMA opened its welcoming arms.


In 1954, Castillo Armas had deposed the democratically elected president, Jacobo Arbenz, with the help of the C.I.A., so he was no shining example of democratic ideals. There remains only a brief note on Mrs. Castillo Armas’ visit; thus one can only guess how MoMA intended to use its ample cultural weapons to underscore the values of a modern society, if at all. MoMA has rarely produced any statements on U.S. government- sponsored attacks on Latin American democracies. Its files have been successfully vetted in this respect to offer no position whatsoever. (It is not surprising that only a pithy note on Mrs. Castillo Armas’ recalls only her visit.)


One can, however, dig into other archival collections at the RAC to find hints giving a different picture. As it is well known, the U.S. government, through the CIA, had been instrumental in the 1954 Guatemalan coup, and NAR, as Special Assistant to the President, had knowledge of it. The idea was floating around since 1953.


A memorandum on the Castillo Armas visit to the U.S. for the Operations Coordinating Board, headed by NAR, underscores the overwhelmingly negative effects of the coup, and how it heavily compromised the image of the U.S. as a progressive, democracy-defending nation.


Such images, however, could be changed, and the memo suggests a psychological “action program” for Castillo Armas’ visit. It is unclear if this “action program” included MoMA. One only needs to turn to the major New York institutions such as Columbia and Fordham University eulogized Castillo New York Times to see how Armas, granting him honorary doctoral degrees in law, and how the city even offered him a hero’s parade. Exposure to such political fallout also compromised MoMA’s image. The cancellation of Mrs. Castillo Armas’ visit due to her husband’s illness must have been welcomed by the museum. Moments like these reveal the complexities of the Cold War and, more importantly, the overlap between political and aesthetic institutions. There are countless documents in NAR’s Washington files that elaborate the fear of communism spreading over Latin America. Although NAR was at this time distant from MoMA, one can find some parallels in political and aesthetic policies. At the same time, however, MoMA attempted to exalt ideal virtues, entrenching itself in an idealism that, contrary to the reality of politics, appears as apolitical. MoMA performed a double play: while approaching the region by celebrating its art and architecture, it hid the deep structural problems that surfaced in the 1960s. Aesthetics thus served to mask social and political realities. The clearest example of this is how the 1955 MoMA exhibition on Latin American Architecture since 1945 parallels the idea of “showcase” advanced at the QUANTICO II meetings. I have not found any primary evidence that connects NAR and this exhibition, and certainly there not need be one. MoMA had regularly been a target of attacks from conservative elements in the U.S. government, like those launched by House Representative George A. Dondero in the late 1940s.


By 1946, modern art had again become a source of concern in government circles. In 1947, George Marshall, Secretary of the Department of State under Harry S. Truman, cancelled the department’s program of circulating exhibits, prompting MoMA to take action.


NAR was a decisive force in having MoMA fill the void left by the U.S. government.


His attention was directed to Latin America. NAR’s involvement with Latin America is well known and documented. Although his interest in the region started before his tenure as director of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs during World War II, it was in this office that he established his reputation and connections in the region. The Coordinator’s Office allowed NAR to form a network of people which became connected to MoMA.


This network however, had to be navigated with care, for it could compromise any governmental funding, even in such a low risk region like Latin America. An undated memo from Susan Cable to MoMA director Rene d’Harnoncourt clearly illustrated the fears about modern art: State Department advises exhibition for Bogota all off. Implication Department afraid of modern art even if project paid for by outside sources. In other words, Department wishes to avoid even platonic relations with the arts of today.


Such concerns only grew worse with the rise of McCarthyism in the early 1950s. These problems could be circumvented by controlling the themes and nature of exhibitions. As Lloyd Goodrich, Chair of The Committee on Government and Art, commented to Theodore Streibert, Director USIA: “There are of course fields in which such political considerations would not arise: architecture, design, crafts, historical exhibitions.” Architecture became a primary theme in the early cultural “importing” policies of MoMA’s


This comment may explain why International Program. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, MoMA remained at odds with the State Department and programs such as USIA. In 1960, Porter McCray informed then New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller that USIA director George V. Allen had advised that “it would be detrimental to the budget situation to have sole responsibility for international exhibitions because of their controversial nature, and that because of this the entire USIA program and its budget might be subject to attack from Congress.”


This had important repercussions since one of the main sources of funding sought by the International Program was precisely government agencies such as USIA.


There is a wealth of information about the relationship between art and politics at the RAC. I have only given the reader the general overview of the unfolding narrative around MoMA’s International Exhibitions Program, concerning Latin America. I will develop these themes in my dissertation.

I would like to thank the staff of the Rockefeller Archive Center, and in particular Amy Fitch, for all their help and support.



1. Two years later, in 1934, the Department of Circulating Exhibitions was officially created under the directorship of Elodie Courter. For a brief history see:

2. Cf. “Obituaries,” Art in America, February, 2001

3. See: Letter to Henry Ford II from MoMA, November 11, 1950. Cross Reference Sheet in Folder 1572, Box 156. Series L, Record Group 4, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers (NAR Papers), Rockefeller Family Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (hereafter designated RAC).

4. Letter, John D. Rockefeller 3rd to Rene d’Harnoncourt, June 25, 1952, Folder 3437, Box 573, Record Group 3, Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF), RAC.

5. Report on the Activities of Museum of Modern Art’s International Exhibition Program, Press Release MoMA No. 46, May 3, 1956. Folder 3439, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

6. A Proposed Five-Year Program of International Exhibitions, June 12, 1952. Folder 3437, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

7. There were two exhibitions of painting and one on drawings, and a total of five on architecture and design.

8. Report on the Activities of Museum of Modern Art 1952-56, Press Release MoMA No. 46, May 3, 1956, p. 3. Folder 3439, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC. Textiles and Ornamental Arts of India was incorporated into another exhibition.

9. Report on the Activities of Museum of Modern Art’s International Exhibition Program, Press Release MoMA No. 46, May 3, 1956. Folder 3439, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

10. Agreement Among the Museum of Modern Art, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and The International Council at The Museum of Modern Art, Inc., December 13, 1956. Folder 3441, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

11. Agreement Among the Museum of Modern Art, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the International Council at the Museum of Modern Art, Inc., p. 5. Dec 13, 1956. Folder 3441, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

12. Projects accepted by the International Council at the Museum of Modern Art for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1957- June 30, 1958. Folder 3441, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

13. See: Projects accepted by the International Council at the Museum of Modern Art For the Fiscal Year July 1, 1957-June, 20, 1958. Folder 3441, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

14. Kennan addressed the International Council in May 1955. See: Letter, Mrs. John D. Rockefeller 3rd, Chairman of the International Council, to Dana Creel (RBF), April 23, 1955. Folder 3438, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC. Kennan address, “International Exchange in the Arts,” was later published. See: Report on the Activities of Museum of Modern Art 1952-56. Folder 3439, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC. For Rothenstein see: Report on the Activities of Museum of Modern Art 1952-1956. Folder 3439, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

15. See: Address by Alex L. Hillman, Meeting of the International Council, December 14, 1956. Folder 3441, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

16. Letter, Rene d’Harnoncourt to RBF, June 12, 1952. For a detailed report on the TV research program see: Letter, Rene d’Harnoncourt to Dana Creel (RBF) Oct 6, 1954 Folder 3438, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

17. See: Report on the Activities of Museum of Modern Art’s International Exhibition Program, Press Release MoMA No. 46, May 3, 1956. p. 13. Folder 3439, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

18. See: The International Council at the Museum of Modern Art: Exhibitions Circulated by the International Program, No. 9, January 1959. Folder 3442, Box 573, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

19. See: QUANTICO II Final Report, Latin America – A Demonstration Area of US Foreign Policy in Action, Folder 548, Sub Series 7, Series O, Box 68, Record Group 4 NAR Papers, RAC.

20. The Museum of Modern Art and its Program of International Exchange in the Arts, March 1961, p. 2. Folder 3444, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

21. The Museum of Modern Art and its Program of International Exchange in the Arts, March 1961, p. 3. Folder 3444, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

22. See: The International Council of The Museum of Modern Art: Current Exhibitions Listing, No. 33, Jan-March, 1966. Folder 3446, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

23. See: The International Council at the Museum of Modern Art: Current Exhibitions Listing,No. 24, October 1963. Folder 3446, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

24. See: Memorandum from James N Hyde to RBF Files; subject: Museum of Modern Art / Inter-American Foundation for the Arts — Latin American activities �conversation with Rene d’Harnoncourt, DSC, JHN, January 20, 1965. Folder 3444, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

25. See: Letter, Dana S. Creel to Rene d’Harnoncourt, Jan 24, 1964. Folder 3446, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC. The Committee was founded in 1962. In 1965 David Rockefeller founded the Center for Inter-American Relations, which later became, the Americas Society. See: Sophia A. McClennen, “Inter American Studies or Imperial American Studies, Comparative American Studies 3, no. 4, 2005: 393-413. By 1967 the Inter-American Foundation for the Arts was absorbed by the Center for Inter-American Relations. See: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1967, National Endowment for the Arts / National Council On the Arts, January 15, 1968. Washington D.C., 1968.

26. See for example the Memorandum of Understanding between the Museum of Modern Art and The Inter-American Committee. January 3, 1964. Folder 3446, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

27. See: Excerpted from JNH memo to DSC, 1/11/66, on Interrelations of Latin American Organizations. Folder 3447, Box 574, Record Group 3, RBF, RAC.

28. See: Sanka Knox, “US Art Displays to Lose Sponsors: Museum Urges Government to take over Support,” The New York Times, Wednesday, May 2, 1962, page 34.

29. Mc Cray headed the International Program until 1961.

30. See: MEMO: James White to Mrs. Mellon, Nov 3, 1955. Rene D’Harnoncourt Papers, III.19. Museum of Modern Art Archives. New York. Castillo Armas visited the US in October and November, after an official invitation from the U.S. Government.

31.The note refers solely to Mrs. Castillo Armas’ last minute cancellation.

32.See: MEMO from CD Jackson to President Eisenhower, April 2, 1953. Folder 4, Box 1, SubSeries 9, Recently Declassified, Series O, Record Group 4, NAR Papers, RAC.

33. See: Memorandum for the Operations Coordinating Board, By J.W. Lydman.: EMU. Subject: Some Psychological Factors in the Guatemalan Situation, SECRET, DRAFT. Folder 91, Box 3, Sub Series 9, Recently Declassified, Series O, Record Group 4, NAR Papers, RAC.

34. See: Folder 1303, Box 133, Series L, Record Group 4, NAR Papers, RAC

35. See: Memo to NAR from Susan Cable, April 28, 1947. Folder 1336, Box 361, Series L, Record Group 4, NAR Papers, RAC.

36. See: Memo to NAR by Susan Cable, Re: Alfred’s Catalog Painting and Sculpture in the Museum of Modern Art, n/d, Folder 1448, Box 146, Series L, Record Group 4, NAR Papers, RAC.

37. See: Folder 1448, Box 146, Series L, Record Group, 4, NAR Papers, RAC.

38. MEMO to Rene d’Harnoncourt from Susan Cable. Subject: Pending matters, n/d. Folder 1323, Box 135, Series L, Record Group 4, NAR Papers, RAC. This memo must be circa 1947, since the conference in Bogot�, Colombia, was held in 1948.

39. Letter, Lloyd Goodrich to Theodore Streibert, July 9 1956. Folder 2701, Box 270, Series L, Record Group 4, NAR Papers, RAC. Goodrich forwarded this letter to NAR.

40. Letter, Porter McCray to NAR, October 19, 1960. Record Group 4, Series L, Box 143, Folder 1411.

41. See: Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Council of the MoMA, INC., April 25, 1961. Folder 1424, Box 145, Series L, Record Group 4, RBF, RAC.


Excerpt from: Del Real, P. (2012) Building a Continent: The Museum of Modern Art and the Politics of Circulating Images. New York: Columbia University. Available at